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Striking a Balance Among Illegal Aliens, the INA,
and the NLRA: Sure-Tan v. NLRB
Since 1943, the National Labor Relations Board has extended rights guaran-
teed to employees under the National Labor Relations Act to illegal aliens. In
Sure-Tan v. NLRB, the United States Supreme Court for the first time re-
viewed this practice, approving it and noting that reporting illegal alien em-
ployees to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) might constitute
an unfair labor practice. Awarding a remedy of back pay was, however, im-
proper as speculative. The author examines the Supreme Court's analysis of
the decision and explores its future impact.
I. INTRODUCTION
A small company in a major United States city is confronted with
the threat of a union becoming the bargaining representative of its
employees. The owners of the company are determined to disrupt
the union's organizing campaign. The owners threaten the employ-
ees with less work if they support the union and promise them more
work if they do not. The owners also threaten employees with dis-
charge and plant closure if the union wins the upcoming election, but
promise wage increases if the union loses the election. The employ-
ees are subsequently interrogated about their union sympathies and
activities.
The scenario was a familiar occurrence prior to the enactment of
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act).' Yet these em-
ployer practices still occur, regardless of the threat of National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB or Board) sanctions. 2
Many employers knowingly hire illegal aliens as employees.3 When
talk of union representation arises at the company, the employers
use the vulnerable status of illegal alien employees to thwart union
organization. Employers may go even further and threaten to have
1. The original Act, 29 U.S.C. 3§ 151-166 (1982) (enacted in 1935), has been
amended by the Taft-Hartley Act. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1982) (enacted in 1947). See
infra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157-158 (1982) (setting out the right of employees to organize and
bargain collectively and defining unfair labor practices of employer interference).
3. Ortega, Plight of the Mexican Wetback, 58 A.B.A. J. 251, 252 (1972). See also
Corwin, The Numbers Game: Estimates of Illegal Aliens in the United States, 1970-
1981, 45 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 223, 250-59 (1981) (profiles of illegal aliens and their
impact upon the American workplace).
the illegal aliens deported if they vote for the union.4 It is precisely
under these circumstances that Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB5 arose.
In Sure-Tan, the owners of Sure-Tan and Surak Leather Company
(employer), after attempting to disrupt an NLRB collective bargain-
ing election in their Chicago plant, caused five Mexican employees to
be deported. 6 Subsequently, an order from the Board was issued
against the employer 7 (affirmed with slight modification by the court
of appeals)S which called the action of the employer a violation of
sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the NLRA. 9
A 1943 National Labor Relations Board case1 0 stated in dicta that
national policy made it unlawful to limit the extension of the NLRB
to an employee based on that employee's "race, creed, color or na-
tional origin."" Since then, the Board has consistently applied the
rights guaranteed under the Act to illegal aliens.12 The court of ap-
peals has approved this Board decision on three previous occasions, 1 3
but prior to Sure-Tan v. NLRB, the Supreme Court had never re-
viewed it.
The Supreme Court held in Sure-Tan that the Act should be ex-
tended to illegal aliens and that the reporting of such illegal alien
4. See Ortega, supra note 3, at 252.
5. 104 S. Ct. 2803 (1984).
6. Sure-Tan, Inc., 234 N.L.R.B. 1187, 1189 (1978).
7. Id. at 1187-88.
8. NLRB v. Sure-Tan, Inc., 672 F.2d 592 (7th Cir. 1982).
9. Id. at 597-602. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982) (section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA) states
it is an unfair labor practice for an employer: "(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title." 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982) (section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA) further defined an employer
unfair labor practice: "(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment
or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in
any labor organization."
10. In re U.S. Bedding Co., 52 N.L.R.B. 382 (1943) (company opposition to a sched-
uled representation election because the majority of the members of the petitioning
union were black held to be improper).
11. Id. at 388.
12. See, e.g., Amay's Bakery & Noodle Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 214, 214 (1976). Here, the
employer discharged twelve illegal alien employees because of their union activities.
He then claimed that state law made it unlawful to employ undocumented workers.
The NLRB ordered reinstatement with back pay, stating that the constitutionality of
the state law had been challenged.
13. The first federal court of appeals review of the Board's policy was in the first
Sure-Tan case. Sure-Tan, Inc., 231 N.L.R.B. 138 (1977), enforced, 583 F.2d 355 (7th Cir.
1978). The court affirmed the Board's holding that illegal aliens are employees within
the meaning of the Act and are entitled to vote in a union election. The second review
was Apollo Tire Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 1627 (1978), enforced, 604 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir. 1979).
The court, citing Sure-Tan, affirmed the Board's policy of extension of NLRA protec-
tion to illegal aliens and confirmed the right of aliens to seek the Board's assistance to
secure rights guaranteed under the Act. The third review was Sure-Tan, Inc., 234
N.L.R.B. 1187 (1978), enforced, 672 F.2d 592 (7th Cir. 1982). The court of appeals reaf-
firmed its holding that illegal aliens are "employees" within the meaning of the Act,
which was established in the first Sure-Tan case.
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employees to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
might constitute an unfair labor practice. 14 However, the Court re-
fused to extend the minimum six month back pay award as a remedy,
calling it speculative and out of line.'5
The Court split seven to two on the issues of extending the NLRA
to protect illegal aliens and on the finding that the employer commit-
ted constructive discharge. Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of
the Court. Justice Brennan delivered an opinion concurring in part
and dissenting in part, in which Justices Marshall, Blackmun and
Stevens joined.16 Justice Powell delivered an opinion concurring in
part and dissenting in part, in which Justice Rehnquist joined.17
The final issue, the question of the proper remedy to apply, was
closely divided five to four. Justice O'Connor was joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justices White, Powell and Rehnquist.38 Justice
Brennan dissented on this issue, in an opinion in which Justices Mar-
shall, Blackmun and Stevens joined.19 In his opinion, Justice Bren-
nan stated that the majority created an anomaly, extending the
NLRA rights to illegal aliens, yet giving the illegal aliens no remedy
with which to guarantee these rights.20
This casenote will give a brief overview of the development of the
NLRA, exploring how the Board and the courts have interpreted the
meaning of the Act. Additionally, the casenote will analyze both the
majority and dissenting opinions of Sure-Tan, discussing their
strengths and weaknesses. Finally, it concludes with an analysis of
the effect of the Court's decision on the status of the illegal alien
worker, now and in the future.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In Sure-Tan, a Board election was held at the employer's company,
resulting in a victory for the union as the collective bargaining repre-
14. 104 S. Ct. at 2808-12.
15. Id. at 2814. The Court stated "The [appellate] court's imposition of this mini-
mum backpay award in the total absence of record evidence as to the circumstances of
the individual employees constitutes pure speculation and does not comport with the
general reparative policies of the NLRA." Id.
16. Id. at 2803.
17. See infra note 115 and accompanying text for a discussion of Justice Powell's
opinion.
18. 104 S. Ct. at 2812 (Part IV of the majority opinion dealing with the remedial
question).
19. See infra notes 116-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of Justice Bren-
nan's opinion.
20. 104 S. Ct. at 2819 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
sentative of the company's seven employees. 21 The employees con-
sisted primarily of illegal aliens. Based on the illegal status of his
employees, the employer filed objections to the election with the
Board, claiming that the illegal aliens were ineligible to vote, there-
fore invalidating the election.2 2 The Board overruled the objections,
and held that the illegal aliens were eligible to vote.23 Subsequently,
the employer requested that the INS check into the status of some of
its Mexican employees. 24 As a result, five employees were found to
be in the country illegally and left voluntarily to avoid formal
deportation.25
Charges were filed, and the Board found that the employer had vi-
olated section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA when he reported the employees
to the INS in retaliation for their union activities.26 The Board held
that the employer's action was a "constructive discharge."27 A cease
and desist order was issued, along with the conventional remedy of
reinstatement with back pay.28
On appeal, the court of appeals enforced the Board's order, as mod-
ified, to require that the reinstatement be held open for four years, so
as to allow the employees time to reenter the country legally, and
suggested that the Board consider a minimum six month back pay
award. The Board accepted the suggestion, and a final judgment or-
der was approved by the court.29
The Supreme Court granted a petition for writ of certiorari,30 on
the employer's request, to review the finding of a constructive dis-
charge and the remedy imposed by the court of appeals.31 On June
21. Sure-Tan, Inc. and Surak Leather Co., 231 N.L.R.B. 138, 138 (1977), enforced,
583 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1978).
22. Id
23. Id. at 140-41.
24. Sure-Tan, Inc. and Surak Leather Co., 234 N.L.R.B. 1187, 1187-89 (1978), order
denying motion for clarification, 246 N.L.R.B. 788 (1979), enforced, 672 F.2d 592 (7th
Cir. 1982).
25. 234 N.L.R.B. at 1187. See Gordon, The Rights of Aliens: An Expanding Role
for Trial Lawyers, 19 TRIAL 54, 58 (Dec. 1983) (the Attorney General is authorized to
allow illegal aliens to deport voluntarily, at their own expense, to avoid formal depor-
tation and the future problems attached to such forcible deportation).
26. 234 N.L.R.B. at 1187.
27. Id. at 1191. Note 5 of the Board's decision stated:
In view of Respondent's [employer's] knowledge that none of its employees
had "papers" or work permits, its request to Immigration Service to investi-
gate named employees would inevitably result in their deportation. Inasmuch
as the request was motivated by the employees' selection and support of the
Union, and Respondent is responsible for the foreseeable result of its action,
their deportation is held to be a constructive discharge violative of Sec. 8(a)(3)
and (1) of the Act.
Id. at 1187 n.5.
28. Id. at 1187-88.
29. NLRB v. Sure-Tan, 672 F.2d at 602-06.
30. 103 S. Ct. 1270 (1983).
31. NLRB v. Sure-Tan, 672 F.2d at 606.
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25, 1984, in a seven to two decision,3 2 the Court affirmed the Board's
interpretation that the Act protected illegal aliens, 33 and agreed with
the Board that the employer caused a constructive discharge.3 4 How-
ever, the Court reversed the order requiring a minimum back pay
award and certain specific reinstatement orders.3 5
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The NLRA was enacted on July 5, 1935,36 to promote the following
policies: the practice of collective bargaining, the freedom of workers
to organize, and the free flow of interstate commerce.37 This original
congressional act created the NLRB as the supervisory body solely
responsible for the administration and enforcement of the Act.38
Following an outcry by employers of the Act's unfairness to man-
agement, Congress enacted the Labor Management Relations Act
(LMRA) in 1947.39 Basically, the LMRA amended the NLRA, creat-
ing more rights for the employees40 and the employers. 41 The
LMRA also restructured the Board, increasing the number of Board
members from three to five and creating the office of General Coun-
32. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
33. 104 S. Ct. 2803, 2808-09 (1984).
34. Id at 2810-11.
35. Id. at 2813-16 (the Court split five to four on this issue). See supra notes 18-19
and accompanying text.
36. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB, Legislative History of the
National Labor Relations Act, 1935, at 3270-79 (1940).
37. See 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1982). See also NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1, 29-32 (1936) (holding that the policy of the Act is to "eliminate these causes of
obstruction of the free flow of commerce").
38. For a thorough outline of the structure and power of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board, see T. KHEEL, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, LABOR LAW (1984).
39. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1982) (also referred to as the Taft-Hartley Act).
40. Employee rights include:
the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to en-
gage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from
any or all of such activities ....
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982) (emphasis added). Section 158 was amended to include subsec-
tion (b)(1) for the benefit of employees, making it an unfair labor practice for a labor
organization "to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
in section 157 .... 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) (1982).
41. Section 158 was amended to include subsection (c) for the benefit of the em-
ployers: "The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination
thereof,. . . shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice . ., if such
expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit." 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(c) (1982).
sel.42 The Board's function is similar to that of a court, ruling only
on those cases the General Counsel brings before it.4s
In order for a business to be subject to the supervisory powers of
the NLRB, the Board must have jurisdiction over that business.44
Section 141 of the Act requires that the business "effect com-
merce."4 5 Furthermore, the employee must also come under the pro-
tection of the Act. The term employee, as used in section 151, is
broadly defined in section 152(3).46 As the Court in NLRB v. Hearst
Publications, Inc. stated: "The experience thus acquired must be
brought frequently to bear on the question who is an employee under
the Act. Resolving that question. .. 'belongs to the usual adminis-
trative routine' of the Board."47 Whether a particular employee is
covered by the Act is left to the discretion of the Board.
The broad definition of the term employee, and the recognition by
the courts that the Board determines who is covered by the Act, left
an open door for the inclusion of illegal aliens within the protection
of the Act.48 The foundation for including illegal aliens was laid in
the 1943 case of In re U.S. Bedding Co. 49 The Board concluded that,
as a matter of national policy, limitations on the protection of an em-
ployee would not be based on "race, creed, color or national origin." 50
Since then, "[t]he Board consistently has held that illegal aliens are
employees within the meaning of the Act."51
42. For an overview of the structure of the NLRB, see K. McGUINESS, How TO
TAKE A CASE BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 25-32 (4th ed. 1976).
43. See supra note 42. The Board cannot raise an unfair labor charge on its own
motion.
44. 301 U.S. 1, 30-32 (1937) (stating that the Board's authority does not reach all
industrial employer and employee relationships, but only those relationships that af-
fect commerce).
45. See 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1982).
The Act then defines the meaning of affecting commerce in section 152(7). "The
term 'affecting commerce' means in commerce, or burdening or obstructing commerce
or the free flow of commerce, or having led or tending to lead to a labor dispute bur-
dening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce." 29 U.S.C. § 152(7)
(1982). See also Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 31-32.
46. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982):
The term "employee" shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to
the employees of a particular employer,. . . and shall include any individual
whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any cur-
rent labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not
obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employment ....Id.
47. 322 U.S. 111, 130 (1944) (quoting Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 411 (1941)).
48. See supra note 46. See also NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111
(1944). "[Tlhe Board's construction of that term is entitled to considerable deference,
and we will uphold an interpretation that is reasonably defensible." Id at 130.
49. 52 N.L.R.B. 382 (1943). See supra note 10.
50. 52 N.L.R.B. at 388.
51. Amay's Bakery & Noodle Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 214, 214 (1976) (where the Board
held that aliens without working papers are entitled to vote and receive protection of
employee rights under the Act). See also In re Dan Logan & J.R. Paxton, 55 N.L.R.B.
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The Board supported its decision that the Act protects illegal aliens
by relying on the language of section 152(3), which makes no men-
tion of nationality or immigration status as a factor to consider when
bringing an employee under the Act.52 Furthermore, the fact that
Congress has yet to make it unlawful to employ an illegal alien as-
sures that the Board's policy does not run contrary to federal law.53
Three times the Board's decision to include illegal aliens within the
meaning of the Act has been reviewed and enforced by the federal
court of appeals.54 However, no Supreme Court decision had re-
viewed these Board decisions until Sure-Tan v. NLRB.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Majority
1. General Introduction
The majority in Sure-Tan felt that several questions arose from the
central issue of whether the NLRA applied to illegal aliens. In an
opinion written by Justice O'Connor, the majority divided the issue
into three major questions: whether the NLRA should apply to un-
fair labor practices; whether the employer's action of reporting the il-
legal aliens to the INS was an unfair labor practice; and whether the
Board's remedial order, as modified by the court of appeals, of six
310, 315 n.12 (1944) (relying on U.S. Bedding, the Board held that "the Act does not
differentiate between citizens and noncitizens").
It is interesting to note that in both these cases, Logan & Paxton and In re U.S. Bed-
ding, the central issue was not inclusion of illegal aliens as employees under the Act.
Yet the Board relied on these two decisions as support for its subsequent affirmations
that illegal aliens are protected. See Comment, Illegal Aliens as "Employees" under
the National Labor Relations Act, NLRB v. Appollo Tire Co., 68 GEO. L.J. 851, 857
(1979).
52. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982). The section specifically excludes
any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, in the domestic service of
any family or person at his home, or any individual employed by his parent or
spouse, or any individual having the status of an independent contractor, or
any individual employed as a supervisor, or any individual employed by an
employer subject to the Railway Labor Act ....
53. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (1982). The Immigration and Naturalization Act makes it a
felony to import, transport or harbor an undocumented person. However, the Act spe-
cifically states the "employment (including the usual and normal practices incident to
employment) shall not be deemed to constitute harboring." See De Canas v. Bica, 424
U.S. 351, 359 (1976) (stating that the "central concern of the INA is with the terms and
conditions of admission to the country and subsequent treatment of aliens lawfully in
the country"). See also Kutchins & Tweedy, No Two Ways About It: Employer Sanc-
tions Versus Labor Law Protections for Undocumented Workers, 5 INDUS. REL. L.J.
339, 346 (1983).
54. See supra note 13.
months back pay, was an appropriate remedy.55
2. Extension of the NLRA to Illegal Alien Workers
The Court approached this question on two grounds, initially ana-
lyzing the policy and purpose of the Act, and then ascertaining if any
conflict would exist between the NLRA and the Immigration and
Naturalization Act (INA) if illegal aliens were included.
Stating that the Board has consistently held that aliens were em-
ployees within the meaning of the Act, the Court focused upon the
language in section 152(3) of the Act which defines the term
employee. 56
The Court recognized that the task of interpreting the meaning of
"employee," as defined by section 152(3), is left to the Board.5v It
fully supported the Board's interpretation in this case based on two
grounds: first, that the breadth of section 152(3) is striking, as it ap-
plies to "any employee" with only a few specific limitations, none of
which include illegal aliens;58 and second, that the extension of the
Act to include illegal aliens is consistent with the Act's purpose of
protecting and encouraging collective bargaining.59 Citing De Canas
v. Bica60 and NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 61 the Court recognized
that if illegal aliens were excluded from the Act, a potential subclass
of workers could be created consisting of illegal aliens working under
substandard terms and conditions with no recourse to complain. This
subclass would erode the unity of all employees and diminish the ef-
fectiveness of the labor unions. 62
Further, no conflict appears to exist between the NLRA and the
INA.63 Referring again to De Canas, it is pointed out that the INA is
concerned with the admission of aliens into the country and their
subsequent treatment. Questions of employment of illegal aliens al-
ready in the country is at best a peripheral concern. 64
55. 104 S. Ct. at 2808, 2810, 2812.
56. Id. at 2808-09. See supra note 46 (the definition of the term employee, as in
section 2(3)).
57. 104 S. Ct. at 2809. See NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130
(1944), where the Court stated that it is "not necessary in this case to make a com-
pletely definitive limitation around the term 'employee.' That task has been assigned
primarily to the agency created by Congress to administer the Act."
58. 104 S. Ct. at 2808-09. See supra note 52 (the limitation upon who is an
employee).
59. 104 S. Ct. at 2809.
60. 424 U.S. 351 (1976). Employment of illegal aliens under substandard terms and
conditions was recognized by the Court as potentially diminishing the effectiveness of
labor laws. Id. at 356-57.
61. 301 U.S. 1 (1937). The Court emphasized the need for employees to be entitled
to NLRA protection in order to deal equally with their employer. Id. at 33.
62. 104 S. Ct. at 2809.
63. Id.
64. I& See also De Canas, 424 U.S. at 359.
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The Court noted that Congress has not adopted provisions in the
INA making employment of illegal aliens unlawful. Specifically, sec-
tion 1324(a)(3) of the INA states that "it is a felony to import, trans-
port, or harbor an undocumented person." However, employment
does not constitute harboring.65
The majority stated that the inclusion of illegal aliens into the Act
is compatible with the policies of the INA.66 It stated that "[i]f an
employer realizes that there will be no advantage under the NLRA
in preferring illegal aliens to legal resident workers, any incentive to
hire such illegal aliens is correspondingly lessened" and "if the de-
mand for undocumented aliens declines, there may be fewer incen-
tives for aliens themselves to enter in violation of federal
immigration laws."67
The most persuasive argument is reliance on the policy and pur-
pose of the Act. As stated in section 1 of the Act, its purpose is to
encourage collective bargaining and protection of the employees'
right to organize.6 8 If illegal aliens were not included in the Act, an
employer could potentially use them to his advantage against the un-
ions.69 The employer would be able to hire illegal aliens knowing
full well that they would be at his mercy, that if they caused any
trouble he could have them deported and hire others in their place.70
For employers with anti-union animus, this would be great incentive
to hire illegal aliens.
Naturally flowing from this argument is the conclusion that there
is no conflict between the NLRA and the INA. Including illegal
aliens under the NLRA could reduce employer incentive to hire
them and will reduce the aliens' incentive to enter the country ille-
gally, as jobs will not be as readily available, thus furthering the pol-
icy of the INA to reduce illegal entries.71
The Court's weakest argument was that portion of the opinion
which dealt with the definition of "employee." It stated that the
term "employee" was "strikingly" broad and that the Board has con-
65. See supra note 53.
66. 104 S. Ct. at 2810. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1982), which states: "[Tihe following
classes of aliens ... shall be excluded from admission into the United States: ... (14)
Aliens seeking to enter the United States, for the purpose of performing skilled or un-
skilled labor .... See also Kutchins & Tweedy, supra note 53, at 360.
67. 104 S. Ct. at 2810.
68. See supra note 37.
69. See Comment, supra note 51, at 863-64.
70. Id
71. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (1976). See supra note 53.
sistently held that illegal aliens are employees within the meaning of
the Act.72 This argument fails because sufficient rationale has never
been established supporting any of these previous Board decisions.73
The Board ultimately based its decision on a 1943 case, In re U.S.
Bedding, which held that race was an impermissible factor to con-
sider in forming a collective bargaining unit.74 That case did not deal
with the definition of employee under the Act, but the national pol-
icy of nondiscrimination.
3. Employer Commits a Constructive Discharge
The majority approached this question by citing section 8(a)(3) of
the Act,75 which makes it an unfair labor practice to encourage or
discourage membership in any union. The Court recognized that it
would be a violation of this section if an employer were to directly
dismiss an employee because of the employee's participation in union
activity. 76 Further, citing NLRB v. Haberman Construction Co., 7 7 it
is possible that an employer could create a working condition so in-
tolerable that the employees' only recourse is to quit.78
In Sure-Tan, the employer was not contesting the finding of anti-
union animus, nor was he contesting the decision in Haberman that a
constructive discharge is possible. Instead, he argued that his actions
did not cause the workers' departure from the country.79 The em-
ployer claimed that it was the employees' status as illegal aliens that
was the "proximate cause" of their departure.8 0
This argument was easily dispensed with by reasoning that the evi-
dence did not support the employer's position. First, there was testi-
mony by an INS agent, given before the Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) investigating the original charge, that the INS investigation
was due solely to the employer's letter81 Second, the Board did not
contend that an employer may never report illegal aliens to the INS;
only if evidence establishes that the reporting was in retaliation to an
72. 104 S. Ct. at 2808-09.
73. See supra note 69.
74. See supra note 10.
75. 104 S. Ct. at 2810; 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982).
76. Id,
77. 641 F.2d 351 (5th Cir. 1981).
78. 104 S. Ct. at 2810; 641 F.2d at 358. See also J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 461
F.2d 490, 494 (4th Cir. 1972) (The employer, knowing that the employee was involved
in the union organizing campaign, changed the employee's working conditions in such
a way that the employee worked at a slower rate, therefore receiving less pay. The
employee eventually quit.); NLRB v. Holly Bra of California, Inc., 405 F.2d 870, 872
(9th Cir. 1969) (held that an employer cannot do constructively what the Act prohibits
his doing directly).
79. 104 S. Ct. at 2810; Petitioner's Brief at 14.
80. 104 S. Ct. at 2810.
81. IM.
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employee's union activity is it a violation of section 8(a)(3).8 2 Here,
"[tihe record is replete with examples of Sure-Tan's blatantly illegal
course of conduct to discourage its employees from supporting the
Union."8 3
Finally, the employer argued that he had a first amendment right
to enforce the federal immigration laws established in the Supreme
Court case of Bill Johnson's Restaurant, Inc. v. NLRB.84 Sure-Tan is
distinguishable in that the employer was not seeking relief from an
injury caused by his employees, nor had he invoked the INA adminis-
trative process in order to redress any wrongs against him.8 5 The
employer was simply a private person who had suffered no alleged
wrongs and sought enforcement of the immigration laws. "[I]n
American jurisprudence at least, a private citizen lacks a judicially
cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of an-
other."8 6 Further, in Bill Johnson's Restaurant, the Court was con-
cerned with the NLRA conflicting with a state interest, which was
not at issue in Sure-Tan.87
The decision of the majority on this question is convincing. The ar-
guments put forward by the employer in Sure-Tan were not persua-
sive. There is substantial evidence that the employer contacted the
INS due to the union activities of the employees. Such anti-union an-
imus is sufficient to negate an otherwise legal action.88 The Bill
82. Bloom/Art Textiles, Inc., 225 N.L.R.B. 766, 769 (1976) (where the Board held
that it was not a violation of the Act to dismiss an illegal alien who was a union mem-
ber when circumstances show that the employer was genuinely fearful of violating a
state law prohibiting hiring of illegal aliens).
83. 104 S. Ct. at 2810 (quoting NLRB v. Sure-Tan, Inc., 672 F.2d 592, 601-02 (7th
Cir. 1982)).
84. Petitioner's Brief at 18. See also Bill Johnson's Restaurant, Inc. v. NLRB, 103
S. Ct. 2161 (1983).
85. In Bill Johnson's Restaurant, the employer was seeking relief from libelous
statements and injury to his business. The Court stated the first amendment right
protected in Bill Johnson's Restaurant is plainly a right of access to the courts for "re-
dress of alleged wrongs." 103 S. Ct. at 2169. The Court further stated "[a]lthough it is
not unlawful under the Act to prosecute a meritorious action, the same is not true of
suits based on insubstantial claims-suits that lack. . . a 'reasonable basis.' Such suits
are not within the scope of First Amendment protection." Id. at 2170.
86. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1972); "The Court's prior decisions
consistently hold that a citizen lacks standing to contest the policies of the prosecuting
authority when he himself is neither prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution." I&
(quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 501 (1961)).
87. Bill Johnson's Restaurant, 103 S. Ct. 2161 (1983) (dealing with whether a state
court lawsuit by the employer against union employees for alleged wrongs during a
strike is an enjoinable unfair labor practice).
88. 104 S. Ct. at 2811 n.6; NLRB v. Transporation Management Corp., 103 S. Ct.
2469 (1983) (The case held that the employer has the burden to demonstrate, by a pre-
Johnson's Restaurant case was of little support to the employer in
Sure-Tan due to the factual dissimilarity between the cases.
4. Six Months Back Pay is an Improper Remedy
The final question the majority dealt with is the remedial order of
the Board as modified by the court of appeals. Section 10(c) of the
Act gives the Board certain remedial powers.8 9 In addition, previous
Supreme Court cases have interpreted 10(c) as "vesting in the Board
the primary responsibility and broad discretion to devise remedies
that effectuate the policies of the Act, subject only to limited judicial
review."90 The main thrust of the majority's position on the remedial
order is that the court of appeals overstepped the limits of its review-
ing authority and, in so doing, created a remedy that even the Board
had no power to devise.91
In Sure-Tan, the court of appeals, recognizing that the illegal aliens
would most likely receive no back pay, suggested that the Board
modify its order to include a minimum back pay award.92 The court
of appeals speculated that the illegal aliens would have continued as
employees for six months had the employer not reported them to the
INS.93 The Board subsequently modified its order, and the court of
appeals affirmed.94
This suggestion by the court of appeals created two problems.
First, the court entered into the realm of policy, whereas its function
is limited to review.9 5 The proper action for the court should have
been a remand to the Board for further determination of the proper
ponderance of the evidence, that the employee would have been fired even if he had
not been involved with the union to avoid a finding of unfair labor practice.). The
Court stated, "[w]here the employer has discharged an employee for two or more rea-
sons, and one of them is union affiliation or activity, the Board has found a violation
(of § 8(a)(3))." Id. at 2472 (quoting THIRD ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NLRB 70 (1938)).
89. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982). This report states in pertinent part:
If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall be of the
opinion that any person . . . is engaging in any such unfair labor practice,
then the Board . . . shall issue . . . an order requiring such person to cease
and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action
including reinstatement of employees with or without backpay, as will effec-
tuate the policies of this Act.
Id.
90. 104 S. Ct. at 2812. See also Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1940).
"[C]ourts must not enter the allowable area of the Board's discretion and must guard
against the danger of sliding unconsciously from the narrow confines of law into the
more spacious domain of policy." Id. at 194.
91. 104 S. Ct. at 2813.
92. 672 F.2d at 606.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. 104 S. Ct. at 2813.
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remedy.96 Second, the remedy devised by the court of appeals went
beyond effectuating the policies of the Act.
97
The Court, citing NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co.98 and
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB,99 stated that the "back pay remedy
must be sufficiently tailored to expunge only the actual, and not
merely speculative, consequences of the unfair labor practices."100
Here, the six month back pay award was not sufficiently tailored to
the actual loss suffered by the employees, but was based on pure
speculation.101 The Court stated that the proper course of action was
to leave to the compliance proceeding the determination as to the
amount of back pay due, if any.'0 2
It was stressed that in order to avoid a potential conflict between
the NLRA and the INA, the Board must require that employees are
legally in the country in order to receive back pay.'0 3 Thus, to allow
the court of appeals' remedy of six months back pay would not only
be outside their limited review authority, but also would create a con-
flict with the policy of the INA of discouraging unauthorized
immigration.104
The Court in similar fashion handled the court of appeals' other
96. Id. at 2813 n.10. See also NLRB v. Food Store Employees, 417 U.S. 1, 9-10
(1974) (the proper course is to remand back to the Board).
97. 104 S. Ct. at 2816. The Court stated in footnote 14 that "[i]n light of our dispo-
sition of this issue, we find it unnecessary to consider petitioners' claim that the mini-
mum backpay awards are 'punitive,' and hence beyond the authority of the Board
under Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 9-12 (1940)." Thus, it is left unan-
swered whether the court of appeals went so far as to create a "punitive" fine against
the employer. However, looking at the language of the opinion, it appears to be puni-
tive. The Court made reference to the court of appeals' comment that "a minimum
amount of backpay ... would effectuate the underlying purposes of the Act by provid-
ing some relief to the employees as well as a financial disincentive against the repeti-
tion of similar discriminatory acts in the future." 104 S. Ct. at 2815 (emphasis added)
(citing NLRB v. Sure-Tan, 672 F.2d at 606).
98. 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
99. 313 U.S. 177 (1940).
100. 104 S. Ct. at 2813-14. See also Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 1 N.L.R.B.
1, 51 (1935), enforced, 303 U.S. 261 (1938) (to determine the actual loss to employee,
any wages earned during the time the employee was dismissed and the time of rein-
statement is deducted from the total possible back pay).
101. 104 S. Ct. at 2814.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 2815. See also Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942), which held
that in devising remedies for unfair labor practices, the Board is obligated to take into
account another "equally important Congressional objective." Id. at 47. In Southern
Steamship Co., the Court reversed the Board's finding of unfair labor practice for the
ship captain's act of firing "employees" who had mutinied.
104. 104 S. Ct. at 2815. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) (1982).
modifications--requiring the receipt in mailing and holding the offers
of reinstatement open for four years as plainly exceeding the limited
authority of the court under the Act.10 5
The decision reached on this question is well developed and sup-
portable. It is firmly recognized that the court of appeals has limited
review powers, and should remand to the Board if it questions any
part of the Board's order.106 In this case there is no question that the
court of appeals overstepped its authority. It was pointed out that
the Board had acquiesced to the remedy suggested by the court of ap-
peals, and therefore the remedy should be affirmed as if the Board
had devised it itself.107 However, this argument misses the point.
The fact here is that the court of appeals overstepped its authority by
suggesting the remedy.OS
Furthermore, the remedy itself is not one even the Board has the
power to devise.1o 9 The court of appeals admittedly relied on mere
conjecture when it set six months as a minimum back pay award.11o
It is established that when computing back pay, only actual losses
may be recovered."'l Here the court of appeals set forth no facts suf-
ficient to support a six month minimum as an actual loss.112
The weakest part of the Court's argument occurred when it de-
clared that the employees must be legally in the country in order to
receive back pay. This position appears to create a double standard
for the illegal alien: one, that they are protected by the NLRA; yet,
two, there is no remedy that can ensure that they are protected.
However, this may not be the case. First, the Board can issue a
cease and desist order against the employer. A violation of this order
can result in contempt and subsequent fines.113 Second, the union
that was elected as the bargaining representative will be recognized
regardless of the fact that five of the eleven employees were forced
to leave, thereby diminishing a potential majority vote.114 These two
results seem to effectuate the policies of the Act. Future unfair labor
practices may be discouraged by one, the possibility of a fine, and
two, the fact that the employer is no better off than he was before.
105. 104 S. Ct. at 2816.
106. Id. at 2813 n.10. See also 417 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1974).
107. 104 S. Ct. at 2813 n.9.
108. Id. at 2813 n.10.
109. Id. at 2813.
110. 672 F.2d at 606.
111. 104 S. Ct. at 2813-14.
112. Id. at 2814. See also id. at 2814 n.l (quoting Sure-Tan, Inc., 234 N.L.R.B. at
1193) (where the Board had already rejected as "unnecessarily speculative" the AW's
recommendation that a four week minimum period of back pay be awarded to the dis-
charged employees).
113. Id. at 2815 n.13.
114. 583 F.2d at 361.
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B. The Dissent
1. Deported Workers Are Not Entitled to Any Remedy
A separate opinion was written by Justice Powell, with whom Jus-
tice Rehnquist joined, in which they disagreed with the majority's
finding that illegal aliens are employees under the Act. The dissent,
however, agreed with the majority's remedial decision, as it provides
less incentive for aliens to enter the country illegally."i 5
2. The Illegal Alien is Denied a Remedy
A second opinion was written by Justice Brennan."i 6 He concurred
in part, agreeing that the illegal aliens are employees within the
meaning of the Act and that the reporting of them to the INS was a
constructive discharge. However, he disagreed with the remedy that
was decided upon.
The dissent attacked the majority opinion on two points: first, that
the majority ignored the fact that the Board had expressly urged the
affirming of the back pay order,"i 7 and second, that the majority con-
cocted a new standard of review."i 8
On the first point the dissent stated that "no purpose would be
served by remanding to the Board for further consideration of the
remedy question.""i 9 This position is based upon the fact that the
Board in its brief advocated affirming the back pay award i20 The
dissent seemed to be sidestepping the central issue raised by the ma-
jority, that the court of appeals exceeded its limited review author-
ity.' 21 Recognition was given to the general rule that "reviewing
courts should remand to the Board rather than unilaterally imposing
modifications of this sort."122 However, an exception to this general
rule was suggested. Instead of a clear cut rule, the court of appeals
would have a choice of whether or not to remand to the Board. Such
discretion would invade the administrative territory given to the
Board by Congress.123
115. 104 S. Ct. at 2820 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
116. 104 S. Ct. at 2816. Joining in the opinion were Justices Marshall, Blackmun,
and Stevens.
117. Id. at 2817.
118. Id. The new standard considered whether the terms of the remedial order are
"sufficiently tailored" to the unfair labor practice it is intended to redress.
119. Id.
120. Id. See Respondent's Brief at 11.
121. 104 S. Ct. at 2813.
122. Id. at 2820.
123. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1982). See also Phelps Dodge, 313 U.S. at 194.
The second point was that the "sufficiently tailored" test, as ap-
plied by the majority, leads to an errant conclusion.124 The dissent
cited NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 125 which stated that "[w]hen
the Board. . . makes an order of restoration by way of backpay, the
order 'should stand unless it can be shown that the order is a patent
attempt to achieve ends other than those which can fairly be said to
effectuate the policies of the Act.' "126 Furthermore, in response to
the majority's concern that the six month minimum was based upon
pure speculation,127 it was noted that the Board relied upon its own
judgment when it decided to support the court of appeals' suggestion.
The Board also stated that this "award is no more speculative or con-
jectural than those developed in other situations . *."..'128 What
failed to be noted was that the Board previously rejected the ALJ's
recommendation of a four week minimum back pay award as being
too speculative.129
It was further advised that the employer should not be allowed to
demand proof of an injury that he caused.13 o Citing Graves Truck-
ing, Inc.,131 an employer should not be able to avoid paying a back
pay award by claiming the employees were illegally in this country
when it was his illegal conduct that caused their forced departure.132
This argument is applicable under certain circumstances, yet here
it should not be used because to do so would conflict with the policy
of the INA.133 The illegal alien would be allowed to receive benefit
of his illegal presence in the country, even though he had been dis-
124. 104 S. Ct. at 2817.
125. NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344 (1953).
126. Id. at 346-47 (quoting Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533, 540
(1943)). In Sure-Tan, the dissent felt the six month back pay remedy was a "wholly
reasonable effort to effectuate" the policies of the Act. 104 S. Ct. at 2818.
127. 104 S. Ct. at 2814.
128. Id. at 2818. See Respondent's Brief at 43-44. See, e.g., Buncher v. NLRB, 405
F.2d 787 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 828 (1969) (allowing for an estimate to be
made of the income that the employees would have earned but for the employer's un-
fair labor practice).
129. 234 N.L.R.B. at 1193.
130. 104 S. Ct. at 2818.
131. 246 N.L.R.B. 344 (1979), enforced as modified, 692 F.2d 470 (1982).
132. Id. at 345, 692 F.2d 470, 474-77 (the Board forgives periods of unavailability that
are due to the employer's own illegal conduct). See also Respondent's Brief at 45.
133. Graves Trucking, Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. 344, 347-48 (1979), enforced as modified,
692 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1982) (employer not allowed to claim no responsibility for em-
ployee's injuries inflicted during fight with another employee, when it was learned
that the other employee had additional responsibility much like a supervisor); NLRB
v. Moss Planning Mill Co., 103 N.L.R.B. 414, 419, 427-29 (1953), enforced, 206 F.2d 557
(4th Cir. 1953) (The employee was fired for union activity, then subsequently rein-
stated with back pay. He was then beaten by his supervisor for refusing to take a com-
promise back pay amount. The court held that the employer could not avoid
responsibility.); J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 566 (1981)
(this case did not deal with a similar issue, but in dicta stated the proposition that the
wrongdoer cannot insist upon proof of the injury).
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covered and forced to leave.13 4
Further, the dissent claimed that the majority created a "dis-
turbing anomaly" by first holding that the illegal aliens are protected
by the Act, yet denying them any remedy.135 It is stated that "[o]nce
employers, such as petitioners, realize that they may violate the
NLRA with respect to their undocumented alien employees without
fear of having to recompense those workers for lost back pay, their
incentive to hire such illegal aliens will not decline, it will
increase."1 36
Finally, there is no conflict with the INA, as long as the reinstate-
ment offers are conditioned upon the employees' legal reentry into
the country. 3 7
The dissent failed to recognize that the majority opinion did not
take away all remedies. A cease and desist order will be issued
against the employer, and the traditional remedy of reinstatement,
with or without back pay, can be ordered by the Board. The majority
decision precluded awarding an automatic back pay award until ac-
tual proof of lost wages is established at the compliance hearing.13s It
is also interesting to note that the dissent's suggested remedy may be
impractical because it is conditioned upon legal reentry of the aliens,
and it is quite possible that they will not attain legal reentry.139
The dissent, on similar grounds, disagreed with the majority on the
134. This would conflict with the policy of the INA of limiting the entry of aliens
seeking to perform skilled or unskilled labor. Allowing an illegal alien to receive back
pay has the same effect as allowing the illegal alien to work in the country. The alien
may not be physically taking the job away from an American worker, but the back pay
award may tax an employer to the point that he reduces his work force. The result
may be less jobs available for the American worker.
135. 104 S. Ct. at 2819.
136. Id.
137. Id, at 2820.
138. Id, at 2815 n.13.
139. The aliens will only gain legal entry for the purpose of performing skilled or
unskilled labor if:
[T]he Secretary of Labor has determined and certified to the Secretary of
State and the Attorney General that (A) there are not sufficient workers [in
the United States] who are able, willing, qualified . . . and available . . . to
perform such skilled or unskilled labor, and (B) the employment of such
aliens will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of the work-
ers in the United States similarly employed.
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) (1982).
See also Gordon, supra note 25, at 54-58 for a review of the rights and the alterna-
tives available to an alien seeking entry into the United States, and the rights of an
alien found in the United States in violation of immigration law.
reinstatement period. It determined that the reinstatement should
stand, and include a verified receipt.
V. IMPACT
The policy of the majority, which favored extending the NLRA to
an illegal alien, is necessary to further the purpose of the NLRA140
and the INA.141 Sure-Tan ensures that employers do not try to dis-
rupt the work force's collective bargaining rights by singling out
some of his employees as illegal aliens. Also, the incentive for aliens
to illegally enter the country will decline as the availability of jobs
declines,142 thus furthering the policy of the INA.143
The ability to enforce this NLRA policy is still at issue. The major-
ity resolved the immediate problem with the best possible solution
while effectuating the policies and purposes of both the NLRA and
the INA. The dissent raised several concerns over the practicality of
the majority's remedial order, calling for a stronger stance to prevent
future unfair labor practices by employers. However, in light of the
fact that Congress has yet to state where the illegal alien workers fit
into the scheme of NLRA rights and INA policies, the majority's re-
instatement with possible back pay, conditioned on legal presence in
this country, is more appropriate.
The likelihood still remains that Congress could step in and clarify
how illegal alien workers should be treated. Congress could state
that illegal aliens are workers within the meaning of the Act, or
could remove them from the protection of the Act by imposing em-
ployer sanctions for knowing employment. Under the latter situa-
tion, once the employer learns that certain employees are illegally in
the country, he would be required to fire them to avoid potential
penalties.44
Until Congress clarifies this question, this case allows the Board to
continue supervision of the work place, encouraging all employees,
140. See Comment, supra note 51, at 864-65.
141. Id.
142. 104 S. Ct. 2810. See supra note 140.
143. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), a recent Supreme Court decision, afforded
the illegal alien another legal benefit. It affirmed the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,
holding for the first time that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment applies to undocumented aliens. The immediate result was to open up free pub-
lic education to the illegal alien coextensive with that offered to citizens and other
legal residents. See Comment, Illegal Aliens Have Right to Free Public Education Ply-
ler v. Doe, 102 S. Ct. 2382 (1982), 61 WASH. U.L.Q. 591 (1983-1984); Note, Constitutional
Law-Equal Protection-Public Education for Undocumented Aliens, Plyler v. Doe, 29
WAYNE L. REV. 1487 (1983); Note, Equal Protection, Education, and the Undocumented
Alien Child: Plyler v. Doe, 20 Hous. L. REV. 899 (1983); Note, Constitutional Law:
The Equal Protection Clause: The Effect of Plyler v. Doe on Intermediate Scrutiny, 36
OKLA. L. REV. 321 (1983).
144. See DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1975).
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regardless of citizenship, to assert their rights, and encouraging all
employers to recognize and honor these rights.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the Board has consistently included illegal aliens as em-
ployees within the meaning of the Act, Sure-Tan is the first Supreme
Court opinion on the issue. The outcome of this case assures the
Board that it may continue to extend to the illegal alien worker all
the rights guaranteed under the Act. The case holding prevents the
forming of a subclass of workers at the mercy of the employer, hav-
ing no rights. Such a situation could undermine the strength of the
entire work force as a collective bargaining unit.
The long range impact of this case is unclear. It depends upon
whether Congress comes forward with a federal policy on the illegal
alien worker. If Congress does nothing, or states that the illegal
alien worker is entitled to the protection of the Act, this decision will
stand in support of the illegal alien's rights in the work place. How-
ever, if Congress adopts a resolution calling for sanctions to be im-
posed upon employers who hire illegal aliens, then the basis for
extending the NLRA to include illegal aliens will fall. Once it be-
comes unlawful to employ the illegal alien, the application of the Act
to the illegal alien would be in direct conflict with federal law.1 45
It is left to be seen what may occur. Until then, this opinion by the
Supreme Court was written in such a way as to allow the continued
application of the NLRA to illegal aliens, while simultaneously avoid-
ing a conflict with the INA.
CARL M. HOWARD
145. See Kutchins & Tweedy, supra note 53, at 359. See also Note, The Simpson-
Mazzoli Bill: Altering the Policy of Neglect of Undocumented Immigration from
South of the Border, 18 TEX. INT'L L.J. 347 (1983) (an overview of the possible effect
the Sirnpson-Mazzoli Bill could have had if Congress enacted it into law).

